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RECONFIGURING PRE-TRIALS AND TRIALS AGAINST ORGANISED CRIME IN IRELAND
Reconfiguring the
pre-trial and trial




Lecturer in Law, University of Aberdeen
Abstract This article describes and analyses the changes which have occurred to
pre-trial detention and interrogation and to the trial process in Ireland as a
result of the apparent threat posed by organised criminality. The templates for
these measures often derive from extraordinary tactics first used against
subversive paramilitary groups. However, while incursions have been made on
protective procedural rights and rules, important safeguards remain which
counterbalance such trends.
Keywords Due process rights; Rules of evidence; Organised crime; State of
emergency
ecent years in Ireland have heralded increased concern about
serious and organised crime1 and a concomitant surge in legislative
action. The notable rise in ‘gangland’ killings2 and gun-related
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1 Although ‘criminal organisation’ was defined for the first time in s. 70 of the Criminal Justice
Act 2006, terminology such as ‘organised crime’ was already in frequent use in legislative
debates, political discourse and police and policy reports without any analysis of its precise
meaning.
2 While ‘gangland killing’ generally refers to a planned homicide effected with the use of a firearm,
the previous Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform (hereafter the Minister for Justice)
* Email: liz.campbell@abdn.ac.uk. I would like to thank Pete Duff and Shane Kilcommins for their
comments on previous drafts of this article.
crime,3 coupled with low conviction rates4 and high-profile incidents, like the
murders of Garda Jerry McCabe and journalist Veronica Guerin in 1996, have
precipitated considerable political rhetoric and demands for legislative action.
The widely held belief in political and popular discourse is that the procedural
rights which accrue to the individual suspect or accused must be reconsidered, as
the undue concern with due process rights is to the detriment of the effective
pursuit of crime control and the safety of the law-abiding public. The President of
the Association of Garda Sergeants and Inspectors has stated that:
the criminal justice system has swung off balance to such an extent
that the rules are now heavily weighted in favour of the criminal,
murderer, drug trafficker and habitual offender.5
The Garda Commissioner has argued, to similar effect, that the system is:
in need of examination, with the burden of proof on the prosecution
now set so high as to be, in most prosecutions, almost unachievable
and the search for truth being sacrificed in a web of technicalities.6
The rights of the individual in the Irish criminal process
The threat of organised crime in Ireland has resulted in the abrogation of various
rights of the accused throughout the criminal process. Although the Irish
Supreme Court has stressed that ‘in accordance with the values on which our
system of law rests, the acquittal of the guilty is not of the same order of injustice
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noted that the term does not correspond to police classifications (see Dáil (lower house of
Parliament) Debates, 13 April 2000, vol. 518, col. 388, per Minister for Justice, Mr McDowell).
Nevertheless, the Minister has used such an expression himself (see e.g. Dáil Debates, 14 December
2006, vol. 629, col. 1677; and Department of Justice Press Release, 19 December 2006). 18.9 per cent
of homicides in Ireland from 1972 to 1991 were committed with a firearm, and this figure
increased to 27.3 per cent between 1992 and 1996. E. Dooley, Homicide in Ireland 1972–1991
(Stationery Office: Dublin, 1995) 26; E. Dooley, Homicide in Ireland 1992–1996 (Stationery Office:
Dublin, 2001) 15.
3 The number of murders involving firearms has increased, while incidents of firearm possession
and discharge of firearms have more than doubled since 2000. An Garda Síochána, Annual Report of
An Garda Síochána 2005 (Stationery Office: Dublin, 2006) 20 et seq.
4 From 1992 to 1996, there was a 20 per cent conviction rate for homicides related to
gangland/organised crime, in comparison to 57.6 per cent for the study as a whole. See Dooley,
above n. 2 at 16–17, table 12.
5 President of the Association of Garda Sergeants and Inspectors, ‘Submission to the Joint
Committee on Justice, Equality, Defence, and Women’s Rights’, 8 December 2003.
6 ‘Garda chief warns on court “imbalance”’, Irish Times, 23 March 2005.
as the conviction of the innocent’,7 the procedural rules which aim to protect the
individual are not immutable. They can be altered to mirror an evolving under-
standing of the appropriate relationship between the State and the individual and
the perceived effectiveness of the criminal justice system. As Galligan commented,
‘[p]rocedures are themselves deeply rooted in a social context and will reflect the
beliefs and understandings prevailing in them’.8
Some of the rights which accrue to the individual in the Irish criminal process are
being eroded by the imperatives of crime control and public protection in the
fight against organised criminality. The most significant alterations to the
pre-trial stage in recent years involve the issue of search warrants, the detention of
the suspect, and the right to silence throughout interrogation. Moreover, during
the trial, evidence from persons on the Witness Protection Programme is used,
trials are held in non-jury courts, and previous inconsistent statements are
increasingly admitted. Nevertheless, these changes should not necessarily be
overstated in terms of the incursions they make on suspects’ rights, given the
safeguards that still remain, including the exclusion of illegally obtained
evidence, the inadmissibility of compelled evidence, the recording of Garda inter-
views, and the rules pertaining to confession evidence.
The pre-trial process
Several developments in pre-trial criminal process exemplify the shift from due
process values to a more result-oriented model of crime control in a bid to tackle
organised crime. The first to be explored involves the issue of search warrants.
Search warrants
The powers conferred on the Gardaí (Irish police) to search premises pursuant to a
search warrant, which they possess ‘in defined circumstances for the protection of
society’,9 have been enhanced in recent years by permitting the officers
themselves to issue warrants. While warrants are generally issued by a judge of the
District Court10 or by a peace commissioner (magistrate) upon formal application
by a member of the Gardaí,11 senior police officers may issue warrants in urgent
circumstances. Such a power was first granted by s. 29 of the Offences Against the
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7 Fitzgerald v DPP [2003] 3 IR 247 at 258, per Keane J.
8 D. J. Galligan, Due Process and Fair Procedures: A Study of Administrative Procedures (Oxford University
Press: Oxford, 1996) 20.
9 Simple Imports Limited v Revenue Commissioners [2000] 2 IR 243 at 250, per Keane J.
10 The District Court is the lowest court in the hierarchy of courts in Ireland.
11 Similarly, in England and Wales, s. 8 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 allows a justice
of the peace to issue a warrant on application by a constable.
State Act 1939, for offences under that Act and for treason.12 This tactic was then
adopted to counter organised criminality, in s. 8(1) of the Criminal Justice (Drug
Trafficking) Act 1996 and s. 14(2) of the Criminal Assets Bureau Act 1996, both of
which allow a Garda not below the rank of superintendent to issue a search
warrant, if circumstances of urgency which necessitate its immediate issue render
it impracticable to apply to a District Court judge or a peace commissioner.13
Although in People (DPP) v Byrne Hardiman J stressed that the power of a Garda
superintendent to issue a warrant ‘cannot be regarded as anything other than an
emergency provision’,14 s. 6 of the Criminal Justice Act 2006 expands this approach
to incorporate all arrestable offences.15 Thus a measure which was first deployed
against subversive crime, then later organised crime, has now percolated into the
general criminal justice system.16
Search warrants issued by senior Garda members are endorsed on the belief that
crucial evidence could be destroyed without the immediate issue of a warrant and
because of the need to investigate crime effectively and expeditiously.17 Never-
theless, it is questionable whether the removal of judicial supervision is
warranted, as it is unclear if grave difficulties regarding the grant of warrants
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12 The constitutionality of a warrant issued by a body other than a judge was upheld in Ryan v
O’Callaghan, unreported, 22 July 1987, High Court, where the issue of a search warrant and the
search were classified as procedural elements of the investigative process and as functions of an
executive, rather than a judicial, nature.
13 The Criminal Justice (Drug Trafficking) Act 1996, the Criminal Assets Bureau Act 1996 and the
Proceeds of Crime Act 1996 were enacted in the wake of the murders of Garda Jerry McCabe and
journalist Veronica Guerin and target organised crime. Two Irish criminologists, O’Donnell and
O’Sullivan, described the murders as ‘the catalyst for a hardening in political attitudes. Crime
control became a national priority and it was almost as if a state of national emergency had been
declared’: I. O’Donnell and E. O’Sullivan, Crime Control in Ireland: The Politics of Intolerance (Cork
University Press: Cork, 2001) 2.
14 DPP v Byrne [2003] 4 IR 423 at 427.
15 Section 2 of the Criminal Law Act 1997 defines an arrestable offence as an offence for which a
person of full capacity and not previously convicted may be punished by imprisonment for at least
five years.
16 It may be the case that political representatives believe that the threat of organised crime is
comparable to that posed by the IRA and other paramilitary groups. Indeed, the former Minister
for Justice claimed that ‘the drug and gun culture ... poses as significant a threat to the wellbeing
of the Irish State and Irish society as the paramilitaries did at any stage of their campaign for a
quarter of a century’. See ‘Gardaí investigate drugs link in latest shootings’, Irish Times, 25 January
2007. However, it does not seem that organised crime as it exists in Ireland poses any threat
to democracy or is working to overthrow the institutions of the State, as were the aims of
subversive organisations. While it is indisputable that serious and organised crime is present in
Ireland, it does not currently constitute a national emergency which merits extraordinary
measures.
17 Dáil Debates, 15 February 2005, vol. 597, col. 1276.
exist. Indeed, the Irish Human Rights Commission (IHRC) denied the existence of
any serious problems in applying to a District Court judge, and recommended the
adoption of less restrictive procedural measures, such as the faxing of warrants.18
This suggestion has not been acted upon by the legislature, which has continued
to extend the powers of the Gardaí in this regard.19
The circumvention of judicial scrutiny, and thus the absence of an independent
examination of the justifications motivating the request for a warrant, renders
the process susceptible to abuse and may harm its integrity. Prior to the
enactment of the Criminal Justice Act 2006, the IHRC proposed that the warrant
provision should require the issuing superintendent to limit the scope of the
search and to exclude himself from direct involvement in that particular investi-
gation,20 but this safeguard was not included in s. 6 of the 2006 Act.
Detention
The capacity of the Gardaí has been further augmented by the introduction of
lengthy periods of detention and questioning for certain offences. The purpose of
arrest under the common law was to take the suspect into police custody to charge
him with an offence and to bring him before a judge to answer the charge;21 inter-
rogation or evidence-gathering could not be lawful motivating factors for arrest.22
However, s. 2 of the Criminal Justice (Drug Trafficking) Act 1996 sanctions
detention for a period of up to 168 hours for suspected drug trafficking offences,23
a provision mirrored in s. 50 of the Criminal Justice Act 2007, which applies to
murder involving the use of a firearm or an explosive, murder of a Garda, prison
officer or head of State,24 possession of a firearm with intent to endanger life,25 and
offences under the Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act 1997 involving the
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18 Ibid.
19 This search warrant tactic has not been challenged in either the Irish courts or in the European
Court of Human Rights.
20 Irish Human Rights Commission, Final Observations on the Criminal Justice Bill 2004, 3 November 2004,
para. 1.
21 D. Walsh, Criminal Procedure (Thomson Round Hall: Dublin, 2002) 149; see Walsh J in People v Shaw
[1982] IR 1 at 29.
22 Ibid. at 30.
23 In England and Wales, s. 42 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE), as amended,
permits detention without charge for 36 hours for serious arrestable offences, and this may be
extended for a further 60 hours, thus permitting a total of 96 hours’ detention. Section 306 of the
Criminal Justice Act 2003 allows an individual suspected of a terrorist offence to be held without
charge for up to 14 days.
24 Criminal Justice Act 1990, s. 3.
25 Firearms Act 1925, s. 15.
use of a firearm.26 Judicial authorisation is required to extend detention past 48
hours and is again mandated after 120 hours. The supervising judge must be
satisfied that further detention is necessary for the proper investigation of the
offence and that the investigation is being conducted diligently and expedi-
tiously. Although a court will order the suspect’s immediate release if it is not
satisfied that detention is justified,27 this safeguard depends on the judge
inquiring into the reasons of the Gardaí for seeking the extension, and may be
pre-empted by the argument that disclosure would compromise the investi-
gation.28
The instrumental justifications for this significant power include the need to
furnish State authorities adequate time to gather evidence, given that the investi-
gation may have an international element or the suspect may have swallowed
evidence.29 Whilst the Minister for Justice expressed his regret that seven-day
detention was included in the Irish statute book, he claimed that ‘it would be far
more regrettable if the State did not take all action open to it commensurate with
the threat which drug traffickers pose to the community’.30 Moreover, the Gardaí
assert that this detention provision is beneficial in the investigation of drug
trafficking offences,31 although no empirical evidence has ever been adduced
to support this contention.32 Nevertheless, it seems that the symbolic effect is
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26 A person arrested under the Acts may initially be detained for up to six hours, and detention may
be extended by a Garda not below the rank of chief superintendent for a further period of up to 18
hours, and again for a further 24 hours. Extensions are granted only if the authorising Garda has
reasonable grounds for believing that it is necessary for the proper investigation of the offence
concerned.
27 Criminal Justice (Drug Trafficking) Act 1996, s. 2(4); Criminal Justice Act 2007, s. 50(5). Indeed,
Casey suggests that judicial intervention after 48 hours means that a challenge to the constitu-
tionality of the detention provisions in the 1996 Act would be unlikely to succeed, and that it
would be difficult to convince the Irish courts that it is a disproportionate response to the social
problems caused by drug abuse. J. Casey, Constitutional Law in Ireland, 3rd edn (Round Hall: Dublin,
2000) 502. Moreover, the provisions would withstand a challenge under Article 5(3) of the
European Convention on Human Rights, which provides that ‘[e]veryone arrested or detained …
shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial
power ...’, given the decision in Brogan v United Kingdom (1988) 11 EHRR 117.
28 A. Ryan, ‘The Criminal Justice (Drug Trafficking) Act 1996: Decline and Fall of the Right to Silence?’
(1997) 7 Irish Criminal Law Journal 22 at 33.
29 Dáil Debates, 2 July 1996, vol. 467, col. 2330.
30 Seanad Debates, 10 July 1997, vol. 151, col. 1143.
31 Minister for Justice, ‘Submission to the Joint Committee on Justice, Equality, Defence and
Women’s Rights’, 10 December 2002.
32 Indeed, the provision in the 2007 Act was deemed necessary to deal with kidnappings and murders
involving firearms because ‘the existing detention periods are not adequate in these circum-
stances’ (Dáil Debates, 5 April 2007, vol. 635, col. 1030), even though no one had yet been detained
for seven days under the 1996 drug trafficking legislation (see Minister for Justice, ‘Submission to
the Joint Committee on Justice, Equality, Defence and Women’s Rights’, 10 December 2002).
sufficient in itself. As the Minister for Justice explicitly stated, ‘[w]e cannot afford
at this stage to give the message to drug traffickers that we are softening our
approach’.33 The use of lengthy detention periods embodies an expressive element,
by demonstrating the opprobrium of the State towards drug trafficking. It also has
an instrumental facet, since long detention periods are believed to improve the
Gardaí’s ability to investigate and prosecute drug crime. Prolonged detention is
indicative of a milieu in which the due process rights of the suspect are increas-
ingly delimited by the State’s tough stance on crime control.34
The right to silence
In addition to the intensification of State powers regarding search and detention,
the right to silence of the accused is gradually being eroded, so as to improve the
likelihood of successful prosecution and preclude the evasion of justice on the
part of suspected organised criminals. This right, which intersects and overlaps
with the presumption of innocence, the right against self-incrimination35 and the
right to privacy,36 is a fundamental element of the principle that the prosecution
must establish and prove the case against the accused. The rationale behind the
right’s very existence is to compensate for the imbalance of power and resources
that exists between the State and the accused. It is seemingly unappealing for the
State to place the accused in a position whereby he is likely to be punished
whether he answers or remains silent when questioned.37 In addition, the right is
underpinned by the rationale of guarding against unsafe convictions.38 Never-
theless, there is a growing belief in political and popular discourse that the right
to silence assists the guilty to evade the full rigours of the law. This is borne out in
a comment of the Association of Garda Sergeants and Inspectors:
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33 Minister for Justice, above n. 32.
34 The use of arrest and detention for investigation of an offence is depicted by Packer as a quintes-
sential crime control tactic. H. Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (Stanford University Press:
California, 1968) 177. Nevertheless, the Gardaí are limited in their ability to rearrest an individual
after detention in custody, ensuring that an individual cannot be rearrested and detained ad
infinitum (Criminal Justice (Drug Trafficking) Act 1996, s. 4; Criminal Justice Act 1984, s. 10(1);
Offences Against the State Act 1939, s. 30A). Rearrest is only permitted if the Gardaí become aware
of further information since the person’s release regarding his suspected participation in the
offence for which his arrest is sought.
35 See J. Langbein, The Origins of the Adversary Criminal Trial (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2003)
277–8.
36 D. J. Galligan, ‘The Right to Silence Reconsidered’ (1988) 41 Current Legal Problems 69 at 88.
37 See R v Director of Serious Fraud Office, ex p. Smith [1993] AC 1 at 32; Murphy v Waterfront Commission of
New York Harbor (1964) 378 US 52 at 55. Also see P. Roberts and A. Zuckerman, Criminal Evidence
(Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2004) 392 et seq., and I. Dennis, The Law of Evidence, 3rd edn (Sweet &
Maxwell: London, 2007) 193 et seq.
38 See Heaney v Ireland [1994] 3 IR 593 at 604, per Costello J.
The present status of the right to silence is an historical relic and
harks back to a previous age when suspects were deemed to be of
limited intelligence. It is untenable that in serious crimes such as
murder and rape, theft or fraud, suspects can refuse to disclose their
whereabouts when questioned and courts cannot draw inferences
from this.39
As the majority of people will never be interrogated in police custody, the right to
silence may seem superfluous and useful only to persons who wish to conceal
evidence of illegal activity.40 This sentiment has taken legislative form in recent
years, with serious encroachments on the right to silence becoming more
commonplace.
A number of statutory provisions which are used in combating organised crimi-
nality penalise the accused for remaining silent; that is, the accused’s failure to
answer will result in a sanction, rather than merely permitting an inference to be
drawn. Under s. 52(1) of the Offences Against the State Act 1939, a Garda may
demand a full account of a detainee’s actions during a specified period of time, in
addition to all information known to him regarding the commission by another
person of an offence under the Act.41 Although this measure was originally intro-
duced in response to sedition, it may now be used against organised crime, given
that firearms offences fall within the remit of the 1939 Act.42
The constitutionality of s. 52 was upheld in Heaney v Ireland where the restriction
on the right was deemed to be proportionate with respect to the aims of the
section to investigate and punish serious, subversive crime.43 The Irish Supreme
Court adjudged that the right of the citizen to remain silent was of lesser impor-
tance than the right of the State to protect itself and to maintain public peace and
order.44 However, this reasoning was not accepted by the European Court of
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39 Association of Garda Sergeants and Inspectors, ‘Submission to the Joint Committee on Justice,
Equality, Defence and Women’s Rights’, 8 December 2003. Such a view is expressed by P.
McLaughlin, ‘Legal Constraints in Criminal Investigation’ (1981) XVI Irish Jurist 217 at 221; A.
Zuckerman, The Principles of Criminal Evidence (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1989) 316–17.
40 See R. Posner, ‘An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence’ (1999) 51 Stanford Law Review 1477 at
1534.
41 Failing to give such information or giving false information is an offence for which a person may
be imprisoned for up to six months (s. 52(2)).
42 Part V of the Offences Against the State Act 1939 permits offences to be scheduled under the Act
and so to fall within its remit. Firearms and explosives offences were scheduled by the Offences
Against the State (Scheduled Offences) (No. 3) Order 1940 (SI 1940 No. 334).
43 Heaney v Ireland [1996] 1 IR 580.
44 Ibid. at 590.
Human Rights in Quinn v Ireland, which stressed that the existence of safeguards,
such as the requirement that a police officer must have a bona fide suspicion prior
to arrest or respect for the suspect’s right to legal assistance, could not alter the
choice presented by s. 52: either the suspect provided the information or he would
be imprisoned for up to six months.45 This ‘degree of compulsion … destroyed the
very essence of his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to remain
silent’,46 and was not justified by the security and public order concerns of the
Irish State.47 Subsequent to this decision, the Committee to Review the Offences
Against the State Acts recommended the repeal of s. 52,48 but such remedial action
has not yet been taken.
Further measures impinging on the right to silence include s. 15(1) of the Criminal
Justice Act 1984 which provides that a Garda who reasonably believes that an
individual is in unlawful possession of a firearm or ammunition may require that
person to explain how he came to have possession of it and of any previous dealings
with the gun. Similarly, s. 19 of the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) Act
2001 permits a Garda to ask a person for an account of how he came to possess
property which the officer reasonably believes to be stolen. Failure to conform to
such requests, without reasonable excuse, is a criminal offence which may be
punished by a fine or imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or both.
In addition to these provisions which in effect criminalise silence, a number of
measures on the Irish statute book permit the drawing of inferences. Section 18 of
the Criminal Justice Act 1984 allows inferences to be drawn from the failure or
refusal of the accused upon arrest to account for marks, objects or substances when
asked to do so by a Garda who reasonably believes that their existence may be attrib-
utable to his participation in the commission of an offence. Moreover, inferences
may be drawn from the presence of an accused at a particular place if the arresting
Garda reasonably believes that his presence may be attributable to participation in
the commission of an offence.49 The constitutionality of these provisions was upheld
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45 Quinn v Ireland (2001) 33 EHRR 264. See Dennis, above n. 37 at 164. Cf. Saunders v United Kingdom
(1996) 23 EHRR 313 where the European Court of Human Rights held that the right not to
incriminate oneself was breached by the use of compelled statements against the accused in court.
46 Quinn v Ireland (2001) 33 EHRR 264 at para. 55.
47 Ibid. at para. 59.
48 Committee to Review the Offences Against the State Acts, Report of the Committee to Review the Offences
Against the State Acts, 1939–1998 and Related Matters (Stationery Office: Dublin, 2002) para. 8.60.
49 Criminal Justice Act 1984, s. 19. Sections 18(1)(c) and 19(1)(d) of the 1984 Act provide that while
failure or refusal may amount to corroboration of other evidence, the suspect shall not be
convicted of an offence solely on such an inference. Moreover, a court is not obliged to draw
inferences. Sections 28 and 29 of the Criminal Justice Act 2007 clarify that ss. 18 and 19 apply to the
questioning of the accused at any time before he is charged with the offence or when he is charged
with the offence or informed by a Garda that he might be prosecuted for it.
in Rock v Ireland where the Supreme Court concluded that the presumption of
innocence was not infringed, given that inferences could only amount to corrobo-
ration and that only those that ‘appear proper’ could be drawn.50
Similarly in England and Wales ss. 34–37 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order
Act 1994 allow inferences to be drawn from the failure of the accused to mention
facts when being questioned or charged on which he later seeks to rely; from his
silence at trial; from his failure or refusal to account for objects, substances or
marks; and from his presence at a particular place.51 These measures are based on
the Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1988, which was challenged
before the European Court of Human Rights in Murray v United Kingdom.52 The
European Court stressed that although a conviction cannot be based solely or
mainly on the silence of the accused or on a refusal to answer questions, this
should not prevent his silence from being taken into account in situations which
call clearly for an explanation from him.53
In the Irish context, s. 30 of the Criminal Justice Act 2007 inserts a new s. 19A into
the Criminal Justice Act 1984, allowing inferences to be drawn in proceedings
relating to all arrestable offences from the failure of the accused to mention any
fact on which he later relies in his defence, if that fact was one which he could
reasonably have been expected to mention when questioned.54 Section 7 of the
Criminal Justice (Drug Trafficking) Act 1996 and s. 5 of the Offences Against the
State (Amendment) Act 1998 are consequently repealed.55 While the inference-
THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF EVIDENCE & PROOF 217
RECONFIGURING PRE-TRIALS AND TRIALS AGAINST ORGANISED CRIME IN IRELAND
50 Rock v Ireland [1997] 3 IR 384.
51 See Roberts and Zuckerman, above n. 37 at 440 et seq.
52 Murray v United Kingdom (1996) 22 EHRR 29.
53 Ibid. at para. 47. As Ashworth and Redmayne note, this indicates a cautious acceptance of the
compatibility of such provisions with the European Convention on Human Rights. A. Ashworth
and M. Redmayne, The Criminal Process, 3rd edn (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2005) 95.
54 Again, inferences are corroborative, and only those that appear proper may be drawn. While the
Balance in the Criminal Law Review Group recommended the introduction of a provision for all
arrestable offences allowing an inference to be drawn from an accused’s failure to mention a
defence on which he subsequently relies, it argued that this should be limited to the recent
invention of a defence and should not permit a more general inference of guilt to be drawn. See
Balance in the Criminal Law Review Group, Final Report of the Balance in the Criminal Law Review Group
(Stationery Office: Dublin, 2007) 86. The Leahy Report had previously recommended an
inference-drawing provision applicable to all serious offences. Expert Group, Report of the Expert
Group Appointed to Consider Changes in the Criminal Law which were Recommended in the Garda SMI Report
(Stationery Office: Dublin, 1998) 31.
55 The Committee to Review the Offences Against the State Acts recommended the retention of s. 5
(above n. 48 at para. 8.63). However, a minority opposed this on the grounds that these provisions
allow inferences to be drawn even where there is no prima facie case against the accused, and may
operate in an unjust way towards the accused, as he may be intimidated in the police station or
may forget facts on which he seeks to rely in court at a later date, having had time for due consid-
eration. Ibid. at para. 8.68.
drawing provisions under the 1984 Act pertain to the accused’s response to the
questions of the Gardaí, the 2007 Act places an onerous burden on the suspect who
must envisage the particular facts which are likely to be used in his defence. This
may result in injustice, due to the fact that the accused may honestly forget to
mention facts or details on which he later seeks to rely in court.56
Infringements on the right to silence are seen as necessary in order to tackle
organised crime. Although s. 7 of the Criminal Justice (Drug Trafficking) Act 1996
(the precursor to s. 19A) was described as ‘minimalist’ in the Irish Parliament,57
this provision represents a significant shift in the fundamental balance of the
criminal process, in which the crime control objectives of the State impinge more
and more on due process values. As the Taoiseach (Prime Minister) said:
The most basic civil liberties issue is the right to life and bodily
integrity, to one’s personal possessions and one’s personal freedom.
The arguments for the unrestricted right to silence of an accused …
are academic by comparison.58
Penalising silence and allowing inferences to be drawn renders the accused a
source of information for the police, thereby intensifying the strain on the
individual. Furthermore, compulsion to assist the police on penalty of impris-
onment involves a significant infringement on individuals’ right to determine the
extent of their cooperation with agents of the State. Such measures suggest a
growing preference for public protection and crime control over traditional
norms of due process and personal autonomy.59
The criminal trial in Ireland
Comparable developments are identifiable at the trial stage of criminal
proceedings, likewise premised on the perceived threat posed by organised crimi-
nality. Three such developments merit emphasis here: extension of the non-jury
Special Criminal Court (SCC) to non-political crimes; increasing reliance on
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56 Indeed, in Averill v United Kingdom (2001) 31 EHRR 839 at para. 49, the European Court of Human
Rights recognised that there may be reasons why an innocent person may not be prepared to
cooperate with the police in response to questioning, especially before he has had the chance to
consult a solicitor.
57 Dáil Debates, 2 July 1996, vol. 467, col. 2343.
58 Ibid. at col. 2373.
59 Walsh, in his dissent to the Report of the Committee to Review the Offences Against the State Acts, above n.
48, described the enforcement of a moral duty to assist the police in their investigation by means of
the criminal law as ‘both an improper use of the criminal law and an excessive encroachment on
the autonomy of the individual’.
testimony from individuals in the Witness Protection Programme (WPP); and
greater admissibility of previous inconsistent statements.
Restricting the right to trial by jury
Trial by jury is traditionally regarded as a central element of the common law
criminal justice system. As the Constitutional Review Group stressed, it brings a
democratic element to the criminal justice system and therefore should not be
interfered with lightly.60 The rationale behind this right was articulated by
Henchy J in People (DPP) v O’Shea, invoking memories of ‘politically appointed and
Executive-oriented judges, of the suspension of jury trial in times of popular
revolt, of the substitution … of summary trial or detention without trial, of
cat-and-mouse releases from such detention, of packed juries and sometimes
corrupt judges and prosecutors’.61 Accordingly, the best way to prevent wrongful
conviction was to allow the accused:
to ‘put himself upon his country’, that is to say, to allow him to be
tried for that offence by a fair, impartial and representative jury,
sitting in a court presided over by an impartial and independent
judge appointed under the Constitution, who would see that all the
requirements for a fair and proper jury trial would be observed.62
Despite the importance of the right to jury trial, there is ‘a tendency to think that,
if anything goes wrong or is thought likely to go wrong with the criminal process,
the first thing to do is to get rid of the jury’,63 and indeed this is evident in the trial
of non-subversive crimes (that is, crimes which do not fall under the rubric of the
Offences Against the State Acts 1939–1998) in the SCC.
The Irish DPP has considerable power to circumscribe the right to a jury trial, by
requiring that a case be heard before the non-jury Special Criminal Court.64 While
persons charged with crimes under the Offences Against the State Act 1939 and
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60 Constitution Review Group, Report of the Constitution Review Group (Stationery Office: Dublin, 1996)
202. This draws on De Tocqueville’s sentiment that juries ‘spread respect for the courts’ decisions
and for the idea of rights throughout the classes’: A. De Tocqueville, Democracy in America
(Doubleday: New York, 1969) 274.
61 People (DPP) v O’Shea [1982] IR 384 at 342.
62 Ibid.
63 P. Devlin, ‘Foreword’ in S. Greer and A. White (eds), Abolishing the Diplock Courts: The Case for Restoring
Jury Trial to Scheduled Offences in Northern Ireland (Cobden Trust: London, 1986).
64 Article 38.5 of the Irish Constitution allows the constitutional right to a jury trial to be restricted
by Article 38.3 which provides for the establishment of special courts where the ordinary courts are
deemed to be inadequate.
crimes scheduled under the Act by virtue of Part V65 are generally tried before the
SCC,66 the DPP may request SCC trial for non-scheduled offences on the basis that
the ordinary courts are inadequate to secure the administration of justice and the
preservation of public peace and order,67 and the judge must acquiesce in such
‘requests’. The DPP’s power is not judicially reviewable in the absence of mala
fides.68 This lack of review is problematic, given the significant effect of a change of
venue on the right of the accused to jury trial.
The trial of a non-scheduled case in the SCC arguably breaches the right to equality
under Article 40.1 of the Irish Constitution, given that only certain criminal cases
are referred by the DPP. This issue was circumvented in Kavanagh v Ireland where
the Supreme Court held that determining the adequacy of the ordinary courts was
a political decision outside the judicial sphere.69 However, when Kavanagh
petitioned the United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC), the Committee
criticised the legislature’s ability to specify by statute which offences were to come
within the jurisdiction of the SCC and to permit other offences to be so tried at the
discretion of the DPP.70 The UNHRC noted that reasons need not be given for these
opinions and, moreover, that judicial review is ‘effectively restricted to the most
exceptional and virtually undemonstrable circumstances’.71 Ireland was deemed
not to have established that the decision to try Kavanagh before the SCC was based
upon reasonable and objective grounds. Accordingly, the UNHRC held that
Kavanagh’s right to equality under Article 26 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) had been violated.72 Nevertheless, when
Kavanagh sought to have this decision applied in the Irish courts, it was held that
the ICCPR did not form part of Irish domestic law.73 It is regrettable that this
serious infringement on the right to equality has not been recognised in Ireland.
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65 Such scheduled offences include firearms and explosives offences (Offences Against the State
(Scheduled Offences) (No. 3) Order (SI 1940 No. 334)), which often pertain to organised and
gangland crime.
66 Offences Against the State Act 1939, s. 45.
67 Offences Against the State Act 1939, ss. 46–48.
68 See Savage and Owen v DPP [1982] ILRM 385; O’Reilly and Judge v DPP [1984] ILRM 224; State (McCormack) v
Curran [1987] ILRM 225; Byrne and Dempsey v Government of Ireland, unreported, 11 March 1999,
Supreme Court.
69 Kavanagh v Ireland [1996] 1 IR 348 at 354. In Byrne and Dempsey v Government of Ireland, unreported, 11
March 1999, Supreme Court, the applicants’ claim that the decision of the DPP breached the Article
40.1 constitutional guarantee of equality because their co-defendants were on trial in the Central
Criminal Court rather than the SCC was dismissed. Hamilton J grounded his decision on the fact
that the DPP is directly authorised by statute to issue such a certificate and to so distinguish
between citizens.
70 Kavanagh v Ireland, Communication No. 819/1998, UN Doc. CCPR/C/71/D/819/1998 (2001), para. 10.2.
71 Ibid.
72 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, GA res. 2200A (XXI), UN Doc. A/6316 (1966).
73 Kavanagh v Governor of Mountjoy Prison [2002] 2 ILRM 81.
A further contentious issue is that the judges in the SCC must act as arbiters of
both fact and law. This poses particular problems as regards inadmissible
evidence, when the judges may be required to exclude incriminating material
from their minds. Indeed, it is questionable whether this is truly possible. As
Finlay CJ revealed in People (DPP) v Conroy, ‘[e]xperience as a judge indicates that
even as a trained lawyer there is a very significant difficulty in excluding from
one’s mind [such] evidence’.74 However, in DPP v Special Criminal Court, Carney J
asserted that while the members of that court may be exposed to prejudicial
material when examining sensitive information, judges are capable of dealing
with the case fairly and in accordance with law.75 It is submitted that Finlay CJ’s
more principled analysis should be adopted, given that it is unreasonable to
expect any person ‘to “unbite” the apple of knowledge’.76 Furthermore, the court is
not required to disqualify itself from a case where it has heard inadmissible
evidence which is prejudicial to the accused, although it has the discretion to do
so.77 It would not be impracticable to require the court to dismiss itself from a case
in which such evidence has been tendered, given that the panel of judges for the
SCC is sufficiently large to allow a reconstituted court to hear the case.78
Despite the historical origins of this special jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has
stressed that Part V of the 1939 Act, which governs the establishment of the SCC, is
not concerned solely with subversive activities but rather pertains to the adequacy
of the ordinary courts.79 Indeed, cases which have been heard in the Special
Criminal Court in recent years that lack any apparent subversive element include
offences of kidnapping;80 the murder of journalist Veronica Guerin;81 and a charge
of receiving a stolen caravan and its contents.82 In this way, limitations on the
right to jury trial have seeped into the ‘ordinary’ criminal justice realm.83
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75 DPP v Special Criminal Court [1999] 1 IR 60.
76 M. Damaska, ‘Free Proof and Its Detractors’ (1995) 43 American Journal of Comparative Law 343 at 352.
77 DPP v McMahon [1984] ILRM 461.
78 G. Hogan and C. Walker, Political Violence and the Law in Ireland (Manchester University Press:
Manchester, 1989) 231.
79 People v Quilligan [1986] IR 495.
80 DPP v Kavanagh, unreported, 18 May 1999, Court of Criminal Appeal.
81 See People (DPP) v Ward, unreported, 27 November 1998, Special Criminal Court; People (DPP) v
Meehan, unreported, 29 July 1999, Special Criminal Court.
82 Irish Council for Civil Liberties, Background Paper on the 30th Anniversary of the Establishment of the
Special Criminal Court (ICCL: Dublin, 2002).
83 S. Kilcommins and B. Vaughan, Terrorism, Rights and the Rule of Law (Willan Publishing: Devon, 2008);
S. Kilcommins and B. Vaughan, ‘Subverting the Rule of Law in Ireland’ (2004) 35 Cambrian Law
Review 55. For an examination of this normalisation process in Northern Ireland and Britain, see P.
Hillyard, ‘The Normalization of Special Powers: From Northern Ireland to Britain’ in P. Scraton
(ed.), Law, Order and the Authoritarian State (Open University Press: Milton Keynes, 1987) 279 et seq.
The primary reason adduced to justify the continued restriction on the right to a
jury trial is the possibility that juries in the trial of organised criminals will be
subject to threats or intimidation.84 As Walsh J noted in People v Quilligan:
There could well be a grave situation in dealing with ordinary
gangsterism or well-financed and well-organised large scale drug
dealing, or other situations where it might be believed or established
that juries were for some corrupt reason, or by virtue of threats, or of
illegal interference, being prevented from doing justice.85
Similarly, in Kavanagh v Ireland, Keane J stated that persons engaged in non-
subversive crime could be tried before a special non-jury court where there
appeared to be a significant risk of jury intimidation or corruption.86 Indeed, the
Committee to Review the Offences Against the State Acts 1939–1998 alleged that
juries are ‘distinctly uncomfortable’ in cases involving organised crime, and
claimed that attempts have been made to tamper with juries in the ordinary
courts,87 thus warranting non-jury trials.
Although parallels may be drawn with the Diplock Courts in Northern Ireland,
non-jury trials in that court were only for offences scheduled under (what is now)
the Terrorism Act 2003,88 and were not determined by the prosecution, as is the
case in Ireland.89 The current relevant legislation in Northern Ireland, the Justice
and Security (Northern Ireland) Act 2007, allows the DPP for Northern Ireland to
issue a certificate requiring non-jury trial on indictment.90 However, this is only
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84 This is notwithstanding the opinion of the United Nations Human Rights Committee that it did
not consider that ‘the continued existence of that court is justified’. United Nations Human Rights
Committee, Report of the Human Rights Committee, Official Records of the General Assembly, 48th
Session, Supplement No. 40, 1993 (A/48/40), Part 1, 125–8.
85 People v Quilligan [1986] IR 495 at 509.
86 Kavanagh v Ireland [1996] 1 IR 348 at 364.
87 Committee to Review the Offences Against the State Acts, above n. 48 at paras. 9.33, 9.36.
88 Part VII of the Terrorism Act 2003 allows for non-jury trials in the ‘Diplock Courts’, and s. 75(1)
specifies that a trial on indictment of a scheduled offence shall be conducted by the court without
a jury.
89 See P. Devlin, ‘Foreword’ in S. Greer and A. White (eds), Abolishing the Diplock Courts: The Case for
Restoring Jury Trial to Scheduled Offences in Northern Ireland (Cobden Trust: London, 1986); S. Greer and
A. White, ‘A Return To Trial By Jury’ in A. Jennings (ed.), Justice under Fire: The Abuse of Civil Liberties in
Northern Ireland (Pluto Press: London, 1988) 58; S. Greer and A. White, ‘Restoring Jury Trial to
Terrorist Offences in Northern Ireland’ in M. Findlay and P. Duff (eds), The Jury under Attack
(Butterworths: London, 1988) 186.
90 Section 1. The Independent Monitoring Commission expressed its preference for the normali-
sation of the trial process and for the use of jury trials if circumstances permit. Independent
Monitoring Commission, Sixteenth Report of the Independent Monitoring Commission (Stationery Office:
London, 2007) 27–8.
possible if there is a link between the accused or the offence to proscribed organi-
sations or to religious or political hostility, and if the DPP is satisfied that in light
of this link a jury trial may impair the administration of justice.91 Thus it seems
that the Irish approach is more expansive than in Northern Ireland. The Irish
DPP’s decision to restrict jury trials potentially may apply to all offences and
offenders.
Non-jury trials are also possible in England and Wales under the Criminal Justice
Act 2003. Section 43, when brought into force, will allow an indictable fraud case
to be conducted without a jury due to the trial’s complex and technical nature.
The provision will be triggered by an application by the prosecution to a Crown
Court judge, who in turn requires the approval of the Lord Chief Justice.
Furthermore, under s. 44 (which came into force in 2006), an application may be
made by the prosecution to a judge of the Crown Court for a non-jury trial on
indictment where there is evidence of a real and present danger that jury
tampering would take place, and where, notwithstanding any reasonable preven-
tative steps, a substantial likelihood of tampering occurring makes it necessary in
the interests of justice for a non-jury trial. Nevertheless, the key difference
between the English and the Irish models is the lack of judicial oversight in the
latter jurisdiction.
While non-jury trials are permitted in limited circumstances in neighbouring
jurisdictions, the scheme in the Offences Against the State Act 1939 provided a
useful archetype in the Irish context which allowed this procedural modification
to be adopted seamlessly for the trials of those suspected of organised crimes.92
The Special Criminal Court is now seen as a normal feature of the Irish criminal
justice system, and there is little political or popular pressure to have the court
disbanded.93
The Witness Protection Programme
Further evidence of the modification of traditional standards, so as to facilitate
the expedient resolution of crime, is evident in the growing use of testimony given
by persons participating in the Witness Protection Programme (WPP) in the trial of
suspected organised criminals. As will be demonstrated, some aspects of the WPP
give rise to concerns about due process. Participation in the Programme is only
available to a witness with evidence to offer in relation to serious crimes such as
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DPP’s decision.
92 Committee to Review the Offences Against the State Acts, ‘Views and Recommendations of the
Hon. Mr Justice Hederman et al.’, above n. 48 at para. 9.93.
93 Hogan and Walker, above n. 78 at 238–9.
drug trafficking and organised crime, and this evidence must be essential to the
prosecution and not available elsewhere.94 Moreover, a substantial threat to the
safety of the witness must exist.95 The witness may be—and in practice often will
be—an accomplice or associate of the suspect,96 so in essence, this means that such
evidence is confined to quintessential ‘organised crimes’.
The use of evidence from individuals who are under the protection of the State is
comparable to the use of ‘supergrass’ or informant testimony in trials for
subversive crimes where traditional investigative tactics are seen as ineffective, as
they were in trials of alleged terrorists in the 1980s.97 In the contemporary Irish
setting, testimony from individuals in the WPP is justified by the secretive nature
of criminal gangs which renders conventional investigative and prosecutorial
approaches less effective and thereby necessitates the adoption of alternative
methods of evidence-gathering. The establishment of the WPP has been described
as ‘a recognition that Irish society was as amenable to the threat of organised
crime as any other society’.98 The Programme ensures that prosecutions may be
taken in cases of serious organised crime such as those involving drugs and money
laundering,99 and to this extent guards against the perversion of justice by those
who seek to suppress vital evidence at major trials.100 Political acquiescence in the
use of accomplice testimony in Ireland itself is to be contrasted with Irish politi-
cians’ vehement rejection of such measures in Northern Ireland.101
Whatever its claimed advantages, the WPP also raises concerns in relation to the
method of witness recruitment, the type of people recruited, and the preparation
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95 An Garda Síochána, Evaluation of An Garda Síochána Policing Plan 1999 (An Garda Síochána: Dublin,
2000) 25.
96 An Garda Síochána circular, above n. 94.
97 See S. Greer, ‘Supergrasses and the Legal System in Britain and Northern Ireland’ (1986) 102 Law
Quarterly Review 198; S. Greer, ‘The Supergrass System’ in A. Jennings (ed.), Justice under Fire: The
Abuse of Civil Liberties in Northern Ireland (Pluto Press: London, 1988). Supergrass evidence was
commonly used in the non-jury Diplock courts in Northern Ireland as an alternative means of
facilitating the conviction of suspected terrorists, when the use of repressive interrogation
techniques was restricted. See Hillyard, above n. 83 at 300.
98 Dáil Debates, 10 March 1999, vol. 502, col. 80, per Minister for Justice.
99 Dáil Debates, 20 October 1998, vol. 495, col. 814, per Minister for Justice.
100 Dáil Debates, 21 April 1999, vol. 503, col. 777, per Minister for Justice.
101 See Dáil Debates, 17 May 1984, vol. 350, col. 1390 where it was stated that ‘[t]he whole concept of
the supergrass seems to go against human rights’. Similarly, it was noted that the legislature did
‘not like to see a system of supergrass trials where the uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice
of one of the accused is used as a basis for convicting people’: Dáil Debates, 6 February 1986, vol.
363, col. 1939.
of such witnesses for trial.102 Furthermore, the enticements offered to witnesses
and the probability that such witnesses are motivated by self-interest suggest that
the use of such evidence should be closely monitored and corroborated.103 The
Court of Criminal Appeal in DPP v Gilligan accepted that benefits are inherent in
the WPP, but stressed that evidence given in return for a specific sum of money
from the Gardaí or the prosecution would be inadmissible.104 The court further
emphasised that strict delineation of the permissible benefits offered to witnesses
and the manner in which negotiations are to take place is vital to ensure the
reliability of testimony.105 While the Supreme Court on appeal acknowledged that
elements of Garda procedures compromised the evidence of some witnesses, this
did not undermine the entire system.106 Although the benefit given to witnesses in
the WPP has been regarded as problematic in certain instances by the Irish courts,
it is generally not seen to damage the validity of the evidence. Nevertheless, in
order to ensure the integrity of the evidence and of the Programme as a whole, it
would be preferable for the courts or the legislature to provide guidelines or
standards concerning the appropriate benefits for witnesses, in addition to
regulating the conduct of the Gardaí.107
The corroboration, if any, required of evidence given by WPP witnesses is a further
contentious matter, given the motivation and typically criminal status of such
individuals. In DPP v Gilligan, the Irish Supreme Court highlighted the danger of
acting upon the uncorroborated evidence of a witness in the WPP, namely that in
the hope of receiving benefits the witness may not tell the truth.108 Nevertheless,
the court concluded that there is no rule of law that such uncorroborated evidence
must be rejected. The trier of fact must be warned that it is dangerous to convict
on uncorroborated evidence, but may nevertheless do so if the evidence is so
clearly acceptable that the trier of fact is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the
guilt of the accused.109 The WPP was accepted as part of the State’s legitimate
response to the changing nature of crime, including organised crime, gang
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104 DPP v Gilligan, unreported, 8 August 2003, Court of Criminal Appeal.
105 Ibid.
106 People (DPP) v Gilligan, unreported, 23 November 2005, Supreme Court.
107 In England and Wales, s. 71 of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 provides for an
‘immunity notice’ which protects an offender from prosecution if the prosecutor believes that
this is appropriate for the purposes of the investigation or prosecution of any offence. Section 72
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against an offender.
108 People (DPP) v Gilligan, unreported, 23 November 2005, Supreme Court.
109 Ibid.
violence, and drug trafficking.110 In addition to this judicial approval, increased
expenditure on the Programme indicates growing reliance on this tactic in
combating organised crime.111 Indeed, it has been argued that to require corrobo-
ration in such cases would be ‘to pander to organised crime’.112 Against this, it is
submitted that rejecting the need for corroboration compromises the integrity of
the trial process and increases the likelihood of miscarriages of justice due to the
questionable motivations behind WPP witnesses’ testimony. Requiring corrobo-
rative evidence would represent a cautious approach reflecting concern for due
process, the presumption of innocence, and the right to a fair trial.
Previous inconsistent statements
Section 16 of the Irish Criminal Justice Act 2006 provides for the admission in
evidence of previous witness statements. This provision was introduced in
response to the collapse of a murder trial in Limerick in 2003, where six witnesses
who had previously given statements to the Gardaí recanted and refused to testify
against the accused in court, resulting in a notice of nolle prosequi by the DPP.113 The
Minister for Justice emphasised that this situation posed a challenge ‘for the Irish
State, for the rights of individual citizens and of entire communities, and for the
system of criminal justice’. Urgent legislative action was said to be required.114
Before the 2006 Act, a prior inconsistent statement could be introduced as
evidence which destroys the witness’s credibility but not as direct testimonial
evidence against the accused.115 In other words, an inconsistent statement simply
undermined the evidence of the witness by impugning his credibility. This
limitation posed significant problems for the prosecution, particularly in cases
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106 at 110.
113 Carney J described the witnesses in this case as suffering from ‘collective amnesia’. See ‘A case of
collective amnesia’, Irish Times, 8 November 2003. Also see Dáil Debates, 15 February 2005, vol.
597, col. 1276.
114 Dáil Debates, 4 November 2003, vol. 573, col. 579, per Minister for Justice.
115 Criminal Procedure Act 1865, s. 4. As Walsh J stated in People (AG) v Taylor [1974] IR 97 at 100, ‘[i]t
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where the evidence against an accused rested solely on one individual’s statement
to the police.116 Section 16 of the 2006 Act remedied this issue for the State, by
allowing previous witness statements to be admitted where the witness refuses to
give evidence in court, or where he gives evidence which is inconsistent with the
earlier statement.117 The prior statement must be voluntary, reliable and made by
a witness in circumstances where he understood the need to tell the truth.118 Its
admission must also be in accordance with the interests of justice.119
Prior to the enactment of s. 16, the IHRC, following the Canadian Supreme Court
in R v B (KG), recommended that all admissible witness statements should be sworn
on oath and video-recorded in their entirety and made in the presence of and after
consultation with the witness’s legal representative.120 Regrettably, these
proposals were not incorporated into the 2006 Act. A further divergence between
the Irish model and that advocated in R v B (KG) concerns the cross-examination of
the witness in question. While the Canadian Supreme Court requires that the
opposing party must be able to cross-examine the witness at trial,121 no equivalent
provision exists in Ireland. Admitting an out-of-court witness statement as
evidence where the witness refuses to testify seriously undermines the right of the
defence to hear and cross-examine the evidence against him effectively.122 This
right of the accused to confront and probe the evidence against him is a corner-
stone of adversarial criminal trial and due process. As the Irish Supreme Court has
held, the opportunity to ‘hear and test by examination the evidence offered by or
on behalf of his accuser’ represents a fundamental ingredient in the concept of
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119 Criminal Justice Act 2006, s. 16(4).
120 R v B (KG) [1993] 1 SCR 740. Irish Human Rights Commission, above n. 20 at para. 5.3.
121 See above n. 117.
122 Irish Human Rights Commission, above n. 20 at para. 5.1. Also see Irish Council of Civil Liberties,
‘Criminal Justice Bill 2004: Presentations—Joint Committee on Justice, Equality, Defence and
Women’s Rights’, vol. 116, 28 March 2006.
fair procedures.123 In addition to the denial of the accused’s right to test the
evidence, the jury may be deprived of the opportunity to consider the witness’s
demeanour.124
Counterbalancing the repressive trend
Although significant changes have been made to the pre-trial and trial stages of
the criminal process in Ireland which augment the powers of the State to the
detriment of the rights of the accused, the capacity of the courts to offset the
potential punitive effects of these developments is evident in a number of
important safeguards. The exclusion of illegally obtained evidence and compelled
statements, the recording of police interrogations, the criteria governing the use
of confession evidence, the Judges’ Rules and the Treatment in Custody Regula-
tions all serve to compensate, at least to some extent, for the erosion of individual
rights in the criminal process.
Illegally obtained evidence
Strict rules pertain to the admissibility of illegally obtained evidence in
Ireland, exemplifying the protection accorded to individual rights by the Irish
judiciary.125 In People (AG) v O’Brien, Walsh J concluded that evidence acquired as
a result of ‘a deliberate and conscious violation of the constitutional rights of
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Ashworth and Redmayne, above n. 53 at 314 et seq., and J. McEwan, Evidence and the Adversarial
Process: The Modern Law, 2nd edn (Hart: Oxford, 1998) 205 et seq.
the accused person’ must be deemed inadmissible ‘where no extraordinary
excusing circumstances exist’.126 He emphasised that the defence of constitu-
tional rights is superior to the duty to try individuals for a criminal offence.127
Similarly, in People (DPP) v Kenny, Finlay CJ recognised that, while the exclusion of
evidence can limit the ability of the courts to determine the truth and so to
administer justice,
the detection of crime and the conviction of guilty persons … cannot …
outweigh the unambiguously expressed constitutional obligation ‘as
far as practicable to defend and vindicate the personal rights of the
citizen’.128
Evidentiary exclusion encapsulates the courts’ elevation of constitutional rights
over the expedient investigation of crime. Nevertheless, the Minister for Justice
has expressed his desire to review this rule of evidence, if it ‘leads to the
unintended outcome of accused persons regularly getting away with crimes on a
technicality’.129 Similar sentiments have been expressed by the DPP130 and by a
majority of the Balance in the Criminal Law Review Group.131 In light of these
comments, change to the protective exclusionary rule may be anticipated.
Recording police interviews
One development which could guard against the possibility of coercive actions by
the Gardaí is the recording of police interrogations.132 The Criminal Justice Act
1984 (Electronic Recording of Interviews) Regulations 1997 provide for the
recording of interviews of suspects detained under s. 4 of the Criminal Justice Act
1984, s. 30 of the Offences Against the State Act 1939 or s. 50 of the Criminal Justice
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126 People (AG) v O’Brien [1965] IR 142 at 170. Walsh J stated that the imminent destruction of vital
evidence or the need to rescue a victim in peril constitutes extraordinary excusing
circumstances. In addition, the imminent destruction of drugs has been regarded as fulfilling
this standard (People (DPP) v Lawless [1985] 3 Frewen 30), as has the preservation of vital evidence
(People (DPP) v McCann [1998] 4 IR 397).
127 People (AG) v O’Brien [1965] IR 142 at 170.
128 Ibid. at 134.
129 Minister for Justice, ‘Rebalancing Criminal Justice—Remarks by Tanaiste in Limerick’, 20 October
2006, available at http://www.justice.ie/en/JELR/Pages/SP07000417, accessed 21 April 2008.
130 Director of Public Prosecutions, ‘Opening Remarks’, 7th Annual National Prosecutors’
Conference, 13 May 2006, available at http://www.dpp.ie/filestore/documents/DIRECTOR_-_
Opening_Remarks.pdf, accessed 21 April 2008.
131 Balance in the Criminal Law Review Group, above n. 54 at 165–6.
132 In England and Wales, police powers of arrest and detention are mitigated somewhat by the
requirement in ss. 60 and 60A of PACE that interviews of suspects in police custody be
electronically recorded.
Act 2007.133 However, only Garda stations which have electronic recording
equipment installed are affected by these regulations,134 and there are no
safeguards mandating the station to which a suspect should be brought.135
Furthermore, the interview does not have to be recorded if the recording
equipment is broken or already in use at the time of the interview,136 or if
recording is ‘not practicable’.137 These are significant limitations on electronic
recording as a safeguard for suspects’ rights.
Limiting the effects of the erosion of the right to silence
The Irish courts have compensated for legislative encroachments on the right to
silence by holding that compelled statements should not be admissible in subse-
quent criminal proceedings. In Re National Irish Bank Ltd and the Companies Act 1990,
Barrington J concluded that a confession obtained under the Companies Act 1990
would not be admissible at a subsequent criminal trial unless the trial judge was
satisfied that the confession was ‘voluntary’.138 While the precise meaning of
voluntary is often not elucidated in case law, the test used is that first propounded
in Ibrahim v R that:
… no statement by an accused is admissible in evidence against him
unless it is shewn by the prosecution to have been a voluntary
statement, in the sense that it has not been obtained from him either
by fear of prejudice or hope of advantage exercised or held out by a
person in authority.139
This protective approach is to be welcomed.
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133 Criminal Justice Act 1984 (Electronic Recording of Interviews) Regulations 1997 (SI 1997 No. 74),
reg. 3(2). Section 52 of the Criminal Justice Act 2007 ensures that detention under the Act is
covered by the regulations.
134 Criminal Justice Act 1984 (Electronic Recording of Interviews) Regulations 1997, reg. 3(1).
135 In People (DPP) v Holland, unreported, 15 July 1998, Court of Criminal Appeal, it was argued that the
questioning of the suspect in a Garda station which did not have recording equipment installed,
rather than in another station which did, was a deliberate tactic on the part of the Gardaí to
circumvent the recording of the interview. However, the court accepted that the particular
station was chosen because it was the centre of investigation for the crimes in which the suspect
was believed to be involved.
136 Criminal Justice Act 1984 (Electronic Recording of Interviews) Regulations 1997, reg. 4(3)(a)(i) and
(ii).
137 Criminal Justice Act 1984 (Electronic Recording of Interviews) Regulations 1997, reg. 4(3)(b).
138 Re National Irish Bank Ltd and the Companies Act 1990 [1999] 3 IR 145, following Saunders v United
Kingdom (1996) 23 EHRR 313.
139 Ibrahim v R [1914] AC 599 at 609. See e.g. People (DPP) v Hoey [1987] IR 637 at 651 where the Supreme
Court described this standard of voluntariness as ‘firmly established in our legal system’.
Moreover, legislative extensions of the power to draw adverse inferences have
been interpreted restrictively by the courts. In People (DPP) v Finnerty, the Supreme
Court emphasised that unless the right to silence is expressly abrogated by
statutory provisions permitting inferences to be drawn against the accused, the
common law doctrine prohibiting any adverse inference must be upheld.140
Confession evidence
Stringent rules governing the admissibility of confession evidence may also
counterbalance the erosion of individual rights at the pre-trial and trial stages of
the criminal process. The rules governing the admissibility of confession evidence
are strict: statements deemed ‘involuntary’ will be excluded.141 The courts may
also declare a confession to be inadmissible where it followed an inducement or
suggestion on the part of the Gardaí that the suspect would gain some advan-
tage,142 or where it was made as a consequence of oppression.143 A pre-trial
admission may also be excluded at trial if the circumstances in which it was
procured fall below the requisite standard of fairness.144 More generally, s. 10 of
the Criminal Procedure Act 1993 requires the judge to warn the jury against
convicting on uncorroborated confession evidence.
The Judges’ Rules and the Treatment of Persons in Garda Custody Regulations
In addition, the Judges’ Rules and the Treatment of Persons in Garda Custody
Regulations 1987145 moderate the harshness associated with custodial interro-
gation. The Judges’ Rules, which were approved in Ireland in People v Cummins,
serve as the basic guide to police conduct.146 As the Judges’ Rules are not formal
rules of law, failure to adhere to them does not automatically result in the
exclusion of evidence acquired as a result of the breach.147 Nevertheless, in People v
Farrell, the Court of Criminal Appeal stressed that, while the Judges’ Rules are
merely rules for the guidance of persons taking statements, they ‘have stood up to
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140 People (DPP) v Finnerty [1999] 4 IR 364.
141 People (AG) v Cummins [1972] IR 312.
142 Ibrahim v R [1914] AC 599 at 609; People (DPP) v Geoghan and Bourke, unreported, 18 November 2003,
Central Criminal Court.
143 People (DPP) v McNally and Breathnach [1981] 2 Frewen 43. Similarly, s. 76(2) of PACE in England and
Wales precludes the use of a confession obtained by oppression or in consequence of anything
said or done which was likely to render the confession unreliable, unless the prosecution can
prove otherwise.
144 In People v Shaw [1982] IR 1 at 61, Griffin J stressed that this rule is mandated by the fact that the
Irish legal system is accusatorial and not inquisitorial, and because the Constitution requires the
observance of fundamental procedural fairness.
145 Criminal Justice Act 1984 (Treatment of Persons in Custody in Garda Síochána Stations)
Regulations 1987 (SI 1987 No. 119).
146 People v Cummins [1972] IR 312 at 317–18.
147 Ibid.
the test of time and will be departed from at peril’.148 Only in very exceptional
circumstances will a statement taken in breach of the rules be admitted in
evidence, and every such breach calls for an adequate explanation.149
The Treatment of Persons in Garda Custody Regulations also protect the accused.
These regulations pertain to matters such as notification of solicitors, the infor-
mation to be given to the accused on being detained, and the proper form of
custody records. However, s. 7(3) of the Criminal Justice Act 1984 provides that
failure to abide by the regulations does not ‘of itself’ render the custody of the
accused unlawful, nor does it affect the admissibility of any statement made.150
Conclusion
The burgeoning threat of organised crime in Irish society has precipitated the
introduction of new legal measures and the proliferation of investigative tactics
originally deployed against subversion activities. Pre-trial protections and aspects
of the trial itself have been altered so as to augment the powers of the State and
thereby increase its ability to combat gangland criminality effectively. The issue of
search warrants by the Gardaí, the extension of detention periods and the erosion
of the right to silence indicate a preference for the exigencies of crime control over
the due process rights of the individual, and represent a move towards a more
result-oriented way of thinking. In court, the right to a jury trial has been circum-
scribed, the Witness Protection Programme is increasingly used, and witnesses’
previous inconsistent statements may be relied on as evidence against the
accused. The overarching rationale for these measures lies in the imperative of
public protection and the drive for successful convictions, which has the effect of
eclipsing individual liberties.
Nonetheless, it is important to recognise the continued existence of safeguards
which counterbalance incursions on individual rights in the Irish justice system.
The inadmissibility of illegally obtained evidence and compelled statements, the
recording of Garda interviews, the rules governing the use of confession evidence,
the Judges’ Rules and the Treatment of Persons in Garda Custody Regulations
offset the attenuation of individual rights in the criminal process. These examples
suggest that the drift away from due process is not unmitigated. Protective devices
exist which temper the impact on the accused of more repressive legislative devel-
opments.
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149 People v Farrell [1978] IR 1 at 21.
150 See DPP v Spratt [1995] 1 IR 585 at 591.
While organised criminals might be portrayed as threatening the justice system, it
is submitted that the phenomenon of organised crime should be seen as a serious
social problem rather than precipitating a pervasive legal crisis with the potential
to subvert the organs of the State. Indeed, it seems that there has been a blurring
of the conventional distinction between social problems and national
emergency151 in Ireland, which eases the seepage of emergency measures and
tactics into the ordinary legal arena. Organised crime in Ireland has not infiltrated
the fabric of government nor does it seem likely to compromise the pursuit of
justice. Moreover, it is questionable whether the purported flaws in the existing
trial system truly demand extraordinary remedies at the cost of significant rights.
As the DPP recently remarked:
In the vast majority of cases brought to court, the trial system
functions well. About 90% of indictable prosecutions end in a guilty
plea, and of the remainder about half end in conviction and half with
an acquittal, leaving an overall conviction rate of about 95% ...152
This is not to downplay the fact that serious and gun-related crime is a growing
problem in Ireland,153 which may in fact merit the revision of traditional
approaches to crime control. Interpretations of civil liberties and rules of the
criminal process may need to be updated or altered given the shifting nature of
crime. However, any adjustments must be grounded in careful political analysis
and widespread popular debate, must be based on adequate evidence of both the
need to act and the likely efficacy of the proposal, must be in the public interest
and should involve minimal restrictions on rights. Such measured consideration
and implementation of procedural reform is currently lacking in the Irish
context, which is characterised by ad hoc and pragmatic rather than principled
reactions to the perceived threat of organised criminality.
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151 B. Hudson, Justice in the Risk Society (Sage: London, 2003) 218.
152 Director of Public Prosecutions, ‘Review of the Criminal Justice System Arising from Public
Concern at Recent Developments’, Submission to the Joint Committee on Justice, Equality,
Defence and Women’s Rights, November 2003. In fact, in 2004 89 per cent of prosecutions on
indictment resulted in a plea of guilty, with a total conviction rate of 94 per cent. In 2004, the
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Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, Annual Report 2006 (Office of the Director of Public
Prosecutions: Dublin, 2007) 41, chart 7a.
153 There has been a sixfold increase in homicide numbers in as many decades, from 10.3 homicides
per year in the 1950s to 60 in 2006: see An Garda Síochána, Annual Report of An Garda Síochána 2006
(Stationery Office: Dublin, 2007) 20. The number of recorded firearms offences has increased
substantially: see An Garda Síochána, Annual Report of An Garda Síochána 2005 (Stationery Office:
Dublin, 2006) 20 et seq. For a useful compilation of crime statistics in Ireland, see I. O’Donnell, E.
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(Institute of Public Administration: Dublin, 2005).

